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Abstract
What is market sentiment? This paper takes a new approach to this question and de-
rives a formula for market sentiment as a function of the risk-free rate, the price/dividend
ratio, and the conditional stock market volatility. The formula is derived from a rep-
resentative agent with a prospect theory probability weighting function. We estimate
the model and ﬁnd that our sentiment measure correlates positively with the leading
sentiment indexes. The model matches the equity premium while generating a low and
stable risk-free rate with low risk aversion. We also apply the model to explain other
anomalies for the aggregate stock market.
JEL Classiﬁcation: G40, G41
Keywords: Sentiment; Prospect Theory; Equity Premium Puzzle; Pricing Kernel Puz-
zle; Sentiment Indexes.
∗Aﬃliation: Culverhouse College of Business, University of Alabama, 361 Stadium Drive, Tuscaloosa, AL
35487. S. Ghazi: sghazi@cba.ua.edu; M. Schneider: maschneider4@cba.ua.edu.
Acknowledgments: We thank Robert Shiller for feedback and encouragement regarding this research.
1 Introduction
Sentiment in the form of optimism or pessimism has driven speculation in ﬁnancial markets
for centuries. Yet, active academic discussion on the role of investor sentiment in ﬁnancial
markets is recent. Empirical research on sentiment has rapidly developed since the introduc-
tion of the empirical index of market sentiment constructed by Baker and Wurgler (2006,
2007). However, from a theoretical perspective, two fundamental questions about investor
sentiment remain: First, what is investor sentiment? In a review paper on measuring sen-
timent, Zhou (2018) writes, true investor sentiment is almost always unobservable, and all
computed measures are proxies. This elusiveness of deﬁning and observing sentiment poses
a signiﬁcant theoretical challenge, and places the notion of sentiment at risk of being a 'dark
matter' assumption (Cochrane, 2017) that is not well understood. Second, what role, if any,
does sentiment have in explaining basic characteristics of the stock market such as the large
historical equity premium, the predictability of the price/dividend ratio, or the shape of the
pricing kernel?
In this paper, we consider a simple generalization of the classical consumption capital as-
set pricing model (CCAPM) that has a representative agent with one of the most promising
prospect theory probability weighting functions (Wakker, 2010), which decomposes probabil-
ity weights into the true probability and a sentiment component. We show that by specifying
the risk-free rate and the market return, the sentiment component can be identiﬁed as the
residual that satisﬁes the Euler equation for the equity premium. We show that this residual
provides a structural formula for sentiment as a function of observable macroeconomic quan-
tities, and we ﬁnd that it is positively and signiﬁcantly related to the empirical sentiment
indexes in the literature (including the Baker and Wurgler (2006) indexes, the Michigan Con-
sumer Sentiment Index, and the Consumer Conﬁdence Index). Motivated by the structural
formula for sentiment, we introduce a simple linear three-factor model of systematic senti-
ment that depends on the three primary factors of the derived sentiment index (the risk-free
rate, the price-dividend ratio, and the conditional market volatility). We ﬁnd that for our
sample period spanning more than thirty years of monthly data, the three-factor model of
sentiment explains approximately 60% of the variation (R-squared) in the Consumer Conﬁ-
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dence Index, 50% of the variation in the Michigan Index, and roughly 30% of the variation
in the Baker-Wurgler indexes. We further show that after removing the systematic compo-
nent of sentiment predicted by the theory from the empirical sentiment indexes, the positive
correlations between diﬀerent empirical sentiment indexes become negative or insigniﬁcant.
Since we match the Euler equation for the equity premium exactly, our approach also
matches the mean and volatility of the equity premium, the market Sharpe ratio, and the
observed time variation in risk premia. Our approach also predicts a low and stable risk-free
rate and generates a large equity premium and low risk free rate with low risk aversion (e.g.,
log utility) and with a small deviation from expected utility theory (a small weight on the
sentiment component of the weighting function). We show that our approach also explains
other eﬀects of sentiment on the aggregate stock market such as the eﬀect of sentiment
on the mean-variance relationship documented by Yu and Yuan (2011), and the eﬀect of
sentiment on the risk-neutral distribution documented by Han (2007). We further show that
the model provides explanations for two fundamental phenomena that are of broad interest
in asset pricing: the time series predictability of the price/dividend ratio (Campbell and
Shiller, 1988; Fama and French, 1988), and the non-monotonicity of the pricing kernel (the
pricing kernel puzzle), as revealed by its empirically observed U-shape (Bakshi et al., 2010;
Sichert, 2018). As the model we study provides a simple way to incorporate sentiment into
asset pricing theory, we refer to it as the Sentiment CAPM.
Despite its simplicity, the Sentiment CAPM ties together four strands of the modern asset
pricing literature by incorporating a role for market sentiment, model uncertainty, positive
skewness and disaster risk.
Other sentiment-based models have also been developed for the aggregate stock market.
However, Barberis et al. (2015), note in their Table 1 that many of the leading models of sen-
timent including De Long et al. (1990a,b), Campbell and Kyle (1993), Barberis et al. (1998),
Cutler et al. (1990), Hong and Stein (1999), Barberis and Shleifer (2003), and Barberis et al.
(2015) do not account for the equity premium puzzle, the large historical excess returns on
stocks over bonds documented by Mehra and Prescott (1985). It is also interesting that none
of these foundational papers on sentiment is directly linked to another pillar of behavioral
ﬁnance: prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Barberis, 2018).
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Apart from the sentiment-based models cited above, Shefrin (2008) provides a general
framework for studying the eﬀects of sentiment on asset prices. Barone-Adesi et al. (2017)
use that framework to jointly estimate sentiment, risk aversion, and time preference from
option prices and historical returns. Drawing from robust control theory, Hansen and Sargent
(2001) consider the role of model uncertainty and uncertainty aversion in explaining asset
returns. Kraus and Litzenberger (1976), Harvey and Siddique (2000), Brunnermeier et al.
(2007), Mitton and Vorkink (2007), Barberis and Huang (2008), and Bordalo et al. (2013)
study the eﬀects of a preference for positive skewness on asset returns. Rietz (1988), Barro
(2006), Gabaix (2012), and Wachter (2013) consider the impact of rare economic disasters
on asset prices. The Sentiment CAPM provides a simple analytical framework that links
these four departures from the CCAPM.
The representative agent we study was previously considered analytically by Chateauneuf
et al. (2007) and Zimper (2012) who both noted that the model can generate a larger equity
premium than the CCAPM. However, the real challenge posed by the equity premium puzzle
is whether a model can generate the full magnitude of the historical equity premium with
plausible levels of risk aversion. This is ultimately an empirical question. Yet surprisingly
there has been no empirical study of the Sentiment CAPM. This paper ﬁlls that gap.
We close by providing the Sentiment CAPM with microfoundations through (i) demon-
strating that the same parameter values that satisfy the Euler equation also explain lab-
oratory evidence on choices under risk, and (ii) by establishing an aggregation result. In
particular, we show that a market with some standard expected utility traders and some
noise traders can generate the same prices as a diﬀerent economy with a representative agent
that has a textbook prospect theory probability weighting function.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the representative agent. Section 3
presents the Sentiment CAPM and derives a general formula that indicates how sentiment is
related to observable economic quantities. Section 4 applies the Sentiment CAPM to explain
the equity premium puzzle. Section 5 constructs a GARCH model for the Sentiment CAPM
and derives a more precise formula for sentiment as a function of fundamental variables.
There we also estimate the derived sentiment index from historical data and correlate the
derived index with the leading sentiment indexes in the literature. We then use the factors of
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the derived sentiment index to construct a three-factor model of sentiment that we apply to
explain variation in the leading sentiment indexes. Section 6 demonstrates that the Sentiment
CAPM predicts other empirical relationships between sentiment and the aggregate stock
market that have been documented in the literature. Section 7 considers microfoundations
for the Sentiment CAPM. Section 8 concludes.
2 Robust Optimization with Investor Sentiment
We consider an economy with one risky asset (a stock), that represents the aggregate stock
market, and one risk-free asset (a bond). There is a representative agent as in Deﬁnition 1
who has non-negative holdings of the risky asset. In the behavioral economics literature, de-
viations from the predictions of expected utility theory (EU) are often explained by prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). We do not employ the full machinery of prospect
theory, but we consider an agent who deviates from EU via a prospect theory probability
weighting function that overweights the tails of the distribution. Wakker (2010) notes that
the probability weighting function that we use (embedded in the agent's preferences in Def-
inition 1) is among the most promising families of weighting functions in the literature and
that the interpretation of its parameters is clearer and more convincing than with other fam-
ilies (p. 210). We refer to such an agent as an EU-Hurwicz agent. Versions of EU-Hurwicz
preferences are advocated by Ellsberg (2001) and Chateauneuf et al. (2007), and they are
formally a special case of cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) when
restricted to choices over non-negative outcomes. Let there be a set S of possible states of
nature, a set C of consumption levels, and a set F of acts in the sense of Savage (1954) where
an act, f : S → C assigns a consumption level to each state.
Deﬁnition 1. An EU-Hurwicz agent has the following value function for an act, f :
V (f) = γE[u(C)] + (1− γ)[αu(C) + (1− α)u(C)] (1)
In (1), E[u(C)] is the agent's expected utility from consumption, u(C) and u(C) are,
respectively, the utility from the best-case and worst-case consumption levels across the
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possible states of nature, γ can be interpreted as the agent's degree of conﬁdence in the ac-
curacy of her prior distribution across states, and α represents the agent's degree of optimism
toward uncertainty. These preferences maximize the convex combination of the agent's ex-
pected utility and a measure of robustness (represented by the Hurwicz optimism-pessimism
criterion). The preferences achieve a separation of the agent's beliefs (represented by a
unique subjective probability distribution) and the agent's ambiguity attitudes (represented
by α) ranging from extreme pessimism (α = 0) to extreme optimism (α = 1). As the agent
becomes less conﬁdent in her beliefs, γ decreases and greater weight is placed on her prefer-
ence for robustness to model uncertainty (the Hurwicz criterion (Hurwicz, 1951), which does
not depend on the agent's probability distribution). Formula (1) for the representative agent
thus incorporates a role for sentiment (represented by α), model uncertainty (represented
by γ), positive skewness (represented by C), and disaster risk (represented by C), thereby
linking four primary strands of the literature.
The EU-Hurwicz agent exhibits two general principles of behavior that have posed a
challenge for EU since its inception: (i) ambiguity aversion and (ii) positive skewness pref-
erence. One form of ambiguity aversion is an aversion to prospects that are less robust to
incorrect probability models (model uncertainty). A classical approach to capture such a
preference for robustness to mis-speciﬁed probabilities is Wald's maximin rule (Wald, 1950)
that remains widely used in the ﬁeld of robust optimization and which selects alternatives
that have better worst-case scenarios.
Models of ambiguity aversion such as those due to Schmeidler (1989), Gilboa and Schmei-
dler (1989), Hansen and Sargent (2001), and Klibanoﬀ et al. (2005) have been used to explain
buying-selling price gaps in markets (Dow and da Costa Werlang, 1992) and the equity pre-
mium puzzle (Collard et al., 2018; Gollier, 2011; Ju and Miao, 2012; Maenhout, 2004). Like
models of habit-formation (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999), loss aversion (Barberis et al.,
2001), long-run risk (Bansal and Yaron, 2004), and disaster risk (Barro, 2006), models of
ambiguity aversion systematically overweight bad outcomes, relative to expected utility the-
ory. However, such approaches do not account for another determinant of asset prices -
positive skewness preference.
The inability of EU to provide a plausible explanation for the observation that many
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people purchase both insurance policies and lottery tickets has been known since Friedman
and Savage (1948). More broadly, most risk-seeking behavior that is observed in real market
settings is often of the form of low-probability, high-payoﬀ prospects, revealing a positive
skewness preference. Examples include the over-pricing of long-shots in betting markets
(Weitzman, 1965) and the overvaluation of positively skewed stocks in ﬁnancial markets
(Barberis and Huang, 2008).
The literatures on ambiguity aversion and skewness preference have largely developed
separately. However, given the important role that both of these biases have in market
contexts, it seems that a more complete model of asset valuation could incorporate both of
these deviations from the classical model.
2.1 Properties of Expected Utility-Hurwicz Preferences
The EU-Hurwicz preference model has several appealing features:
1. Separating Beliefs and Ambiguity Preferences: EU-Hurwicz preferences achieve
a separation of the decision maker's subjective beliefs (represented by a unique sub-
jective prior distribution over states) and the decision maker's ambiguity attitudes
(represented by α). An EU-Hurwicz agent has two objectives: maximizing expected
utility with respect to her subjective prior, and making investment decisions that are
robust to a mis-speciﬁed prior. The parameter γ determines how the agent trades oﬀ
these two objectives.
2. Separating the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution and Risk Aversion:
EU-Hurwicz preferences provide a partial separation between risk aversion and the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution which does not hold under the standard EU
model.
3. Axiomatic Foundations: EU-Hurwicz preferences satisfy basic normative properties
including transitivity and ﬁrst order stochastic dominance with respect to the agent's
probability distribution over states. They have a theoretical foundation as they satisfy
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the axioms of two basic models of choice under uncertainty, the multiple priors model
(Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989; Ghirardato et al., 2004), and the Choquet expected
utility model (Schmeidler, 1989; Chateauneuf et al., 2007). EU-Hurwicz preferences
are also given an explicit axiomatic characterization by Chateauneuf et al. (2007).
4. Prospect Theory Probability Weighting: An EU-Hurwicz agent has a textbook
prospect theory probability weighting function (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Wakker,
2010) that overweights the tails of the distribution.
5. Ambiguity Aversion and Skewness Preference: EU-Hurwicz preferences incor-
porate a bias toward prospects that are robust to model uncertainty (by overweighting
the worst outcome), and a bias toward prospects that have high potential (by over-
weighting the best outcome). That is, EU-Hurwicz preferences capture forms of both
ambiguity aversion and positive skewness preference.
3 The Sentiment CAPM
A representative EU-Hurwicz agent faces the following two-date optimization problem:
max
{Ct,Bt,St}
u(Ct) + γEtβu(Ct+1) + (1− γ)β[αtu(Ct+1) + (1− αt)u(Ct+1)] (2)
s.t. Ct + StPt +Bt = St−1(Pt +Dt) +R
f
t−1Bt−1 + Ωt,
where St and Bt are holdings of the stock and bond, respectively, R
f
t is the real risk-
free rate, and Pt and Dt are the stock price and dividend. Ωt represents other sources
of income. Assuming that the space of outcomes next period is compact, one can write
Ct+1 = maxs∈S Cs,t+1, Ct+1 = mins∈S Cs,t+1. In case of stochastic outcomes with an un-
bounded support like a normal distribution, we assume that the agent has a rule to truncate
the tails of the distribution. Finally, αt ∈ [0, 1] is our measure of sentiment that represents
optimism. An economy with a representative EU-Hurwicz agent was ﬁrst considered in
Chateauneuf et al. (2007) and Zimper (2012). It is easy to show that the Euler equation for
7
the gross market return Rt+1 =
Pt+1+Dt+1
Pt
is
γEtMt+1Rt+1 + (1− γ)
(
αtM t+1Rt+1 + (1− αt)M t+1Rt+1
)
= 1, (3)
where Mt+1 ≡ β u′(Ct+1)u′(Ct) . We use M t+1 and Rt+1 to denote the next period's values of Mt+1
and the market return in the optimistic scenario, andM t+1 and Rt+1 represent these variables
in the pessimistic scenario. Similarly, the Euler equation for the gross risk-free rate Rft is
γEtMt+1R
f
t + (1− γ)
(
αtM t+1R
f
t + (1− αt)M t+1Rft
)
= 1. (4)
Subtracting (4) from (3) gives us the equity premium for the EU-Hurwicz agent. After
rearranging the terms we have
EtRt+1 −Rft =−
Covt(Mt+1, Rt+1)
EtMt+1
+(
1− γ
γ
)[
αt
M t+1(R
f
t −Rt+1)
EtMt+1
+ (1− αt)M t+1(R
f
t −Rt+1)
EtMt+1
]
. (5)
The risk premium can be expressed as a linear factor model. Deﬁning
β1 ≡ Covt(Mt+1, Rt+1)
V art(Mt+1)
, β2 ≡ Rft −Rt+1, β3 ≡ Rt+1 −Rft ,
the equity premium in (5) can be written as a three-factor asset pricing model in (6):
Corollary 2. In equilibrium, for a representative EU-Hurwicz agent, the equity premium is
EtRt+1 −Rft = β1
[
−V art(Mt+1)
Et [Mt+1]
]
+ β2
[
αt(
1−γ
γ
)M t+1
Et [Mt+1]
]
+ β3
[
−(1− αt)(
1−γ
γ
)M t+1
Et [Mt+1]
]
(6)
In (6), the equity premium depends on the index of dispersion forMt+1 and the covariance
of asset returns with Mt+1, as in the standard CCAPM, as well as on a bull sentiment
factor and a bear sentiment factor. In addition, β2 quantiﬁes the asset's exposure to bullish
sentiment, and β3 quantiﬁes the asset's exposure to bearish sentiment. In particular, the
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asset has greater exposure to bullish sentiment if it has high potential (high Rt+1) in the
optimistic scenario, resulting in lower equilibrium expected returns. The asset has greater
exposure to bearish sentiment if it has extreme negative returns (low Rt+1) in the pessimistic
scenario, resulting in higher equilibrium expected returns. The bullish sentiment factor
becomes more negative as optimism (αt) increases. The bearish sentiment factor becomes
larger as optimism (αt) decreases.
Lu and Murray (2019) ﬁnd that a particular form of bear market risk, the risk-neutral
probability of future bear market states is a priced risk factor. Consistent with this ﬁnding,
note that in (5),
(1−αt)Mt+1
Et[Mt+1]
is a priced risk factor and (1 − αt) is a component of the risk-
neutral probability of a future bear market state for a representative EU-Hurwicz agent.
Since the three-factor model in (5) generalizes the classical Consumption CAPM to in-
clude a role for investor sentiment, we refer to (5) as the Sentiment CAPM.
4 The Historical Equity Premium
We next ﬁnd the range of EU-Hurwicz parameters that satisfy the unconditional long-run
moments for the equity-premium and the risk-free rate. The Euler equations for the risk-free
rate and the equity premium are given by formulas (4) and (5), respectively. We further
assume that the EU-Hurwicz agent has a time separable constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) period utility and we denote the risk aversion parameter by θ. We use the following
simple speciﬁcation for the future consumption growth and market return.
Assumption 3. The next period consumption growth and market return have conditional
log-normal distributions:
∆ct+1 ≡ log Ct+1
Ct
∼ N (µ, σ2)
rt+1 ≡ log(Rt+1) ∼ N (xt, q2t ).
Next, we specify how the EU-Hurwicz agent estimates the best and worst-case scenarios.
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Assumption 4. The EU-Hurwicz representative agent truncates the tails of a normal dis-
tribution based on the (conditional) standard deviation from the (conditional) mean:
∆ct+1 = µ+ ξσ, rt+1 = xt + ξqt
∆ct+1 = µ− ξσ, rt+1 = xt − ξqt,
where ξ and ξ are ﬁxed numbers.
The variable xt represents the best prediction of the market return. In Section 6 we show
that under the Sentiment CAPM, the price-dividend ratio must have return predictability
in response to changes in sentiment, making the price-dividend ratio a natural predictor for
the market return in our setting. Given the CRRA utility function, Mt+1 = β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−θ
=
elnβ−θ∆ct+1 = e−ρ−θ∆ct+1 , where ρ ≡ − ln β. The log-normality assumptions imply
EtMt+1 = e
−ρ−θµ+ 1
2
θ2σ2 , σt(Mt+1) = EtMt+1
√
eθ2σ2 − 1
EtRt+1 = e
xt+
1
2
q2t , σt(Rt+1) = EtRt+1
√
eq
2
t − 1,
and hence, the covariance term in the equity premium equation equals
−Covt(Mt+1, Rt+1)
EtMt+1
= ηθσqt(1 + xt +
1
2
q2t ),
where η is the time invariant correlation between the log market return and log consumption
growth, and the equality follows from the approximation ex = 1 + x, for small values of x.
Since we use this approximation frequently, we write it as an extra assumption.
Assumption 5. For small values of x we have ex = 1 + x.
Using the above assumptions 3-5 on (i) conditional log-linearity of future returns and con-
sumption growth; (ii) assuming that the EU-Hurwicz agent truncates normal distributions;
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and (iii) approximating ex for small x, we can rewrite the equity premium (5) as (7):
xrt +
1
2
q2t = ηθσqt(1 + xt +
1
2
q2t )−
1− γ
γ
[
αt
(
1− 1
2
θ2σ2 − θξσ)(xrt + ξqt) + (1− αt)(1− 1
2
θ2σ2 + θξσ
)
(xrt − ξqt)
]
, (7)
where Rft = 1 + r
f
t , rf,t ≡ ln(1 + rft ) and xrt ≡ xt − rf,t.
This result allows us to specify the sentiment as the residual αt that satisﬁes equity
premium equation (5). Corollary 6 presents the residual sentiment.
Corollary 6. In an economy with an EU-Hurwicz representative agent and under assump-
tions 3-5, the sentiment αt that satisﬁes the equation for the equity premium is
αt =
(ξqt − xrt)(1− 12θ2σ2 + θξσ)−
(
γ
1−γ
) [
xrt +
1
2
q2t − ηθσqt(1 + xt + 12q2t )
]
(ξ + ξ)qt(1− 12θ2σ2) + θσ
[
qt(ξ
2 − ξ2)− xrt(ξ + ξ)
] . (8)
Except for the model parameters {γ, ξ, ξ, θ} the right hand side of (8) is all data. Corollary
6 shows the required deviation from the expected utility theory in order to match the equity
premium. We can use data to calibrate the parameters ξ and ξ based on the maximum
and minimum values of consumption growth and the market return in comparison to their
mean. Since we are using the exponential approximation, it is instructive to see the eﬀect of
shrinking the time period (i.e., dropping the second-oder terms). In that case, (8) reduces
to the following simple equation
α ≈ ξ
ξ + ξ
− 1
(ξ + ξ)(1− γ)
xr
q
, (9)
where we have also dropped the t subscript because we use this equation only for the long-run
(with unconditional moments). Notice that dropping the second order terms reveals that
sentiment is approximately a function of the Sharpe ratio, and that the value of the risk
aversion parameter θ is not very important to match the equity premium. However, as we
see shortly, we can use this parameter (in conjunction with ρ) to match the risk-free rate.
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Next, we focus on the risk-free rate. Using the Euler equation (4), we can derive the
risk-free rate as a function of sentiment.
Corollary 7. The risk-free rate with the EU-Hurwicz representative agent and the CRRA
utility is
rf,t = ρ+ θµ− γ 1
2
θ2σ2 + (1− γ)θσ[αt(ξ + ξ)− ξ]. (10)
Proof. See appendix A.
As we did with the equity premium, we can derive the sentiment that satisﬁes the risk-free
rate. Dropping the second-order terms, and solving (4) for α, we have
α ≈ ξ
ξ + ξ
− 1
(ξ + ξ)(1− γ)
ρ+ θµ− rf
θσ
. (11)
Comparing (9) and (11) shows that it is possible to ﬁnd an α that satisﬁes both the
equity premium and the risk-free rate for every value of γ. The condition that we need to
satisfy is the following
xr
q
=
ρ+ θµ− rf
θσ
,
which can be written as the θ parameter in terms of ρ.
Corollary 8. In order to satisfy both the equity premium and the risk-free rate, we need to
have the following relationship between parameters that determine the inter-temporal elastic-
ity of substitution θ and the temporal discount-rate ρ:
θ =
rf − ρ
µ− σ xr
q
. (12)
It is instructive to compare (12) with the risk-aversion parameter θEU that one gets from
12
the standard Euler equation of the risk-free rate with expected-utility1:
θEU ≡ rf − ρ
µ
<
rf − ρ
µ− σ xr
q
.
Clearly, the EU-Hurwicz agent needs a higher risk-aversion parameter θ to match both the
risk-free rate and the equity-premium, and the deviation from the standard EU risk-aversion
θEU depends on the key data moment σ
xr
q
. Still, one can use the historical moments to see
that the EU-Hurwicz risk-aversion parameter cannot be much higher than one.
In order to show the loci of parameters (α, γ) and (θ, ρ) that satisfy both the equity
premium and the risk-free rate, we use the historical moments of the U.S. data to depict
equations (9) and (12). For illustration, we take the widely used set of statistics for the
post-war period from Cochrane (2009) in which the real market return is about 9% with
a standard deviation of about 16%. The real return on treasury bills has been about 1%,
and so are the mean and standard deviation of the real per capita consumption growth
(measured as non-durables plus services). It remains to calibrate {ξ, ξ}, for which we use
the monthly real per capita consumption growth data. We use the statistics µ(∆c)−min(∆c)
σ(∆c)
and max(∆c)−µ(∆c)
σ(∆c)
to calibrate {ξ, ξ}. The aggregate consumption series is the sum of non-
durables and services from the National Income and Product Account (NIPA) monthly series
DNDGRC and DSERRC. Population is the U.S. civilian non-institutional population age 16
and over, FRED2 series CNP16OV. Finally, we use the consumer price index (CPI) from
CRSP3 U.S. Treasury and Inﬂation Indexes. The per capita real consumption growth is
the growth rate of consumption divided by CPI times the population. Table 1 shows the
summary statistics for the log of the monthly real per capita consumption growth. Thus,
we have µ(∆c)−min(∆c)
σ(∆c)
= 4.69 and max(∆c)−µ(∆c)
σ(∆c)
= 3.27, that we round up to the closest
integer, that is, ξ = 5 and ξ = 4. Table 2 shows the moments and the calibration that we
use to determine the set of parameters that satisfy both the equity premium sentiment (9)
and the risk-free rate sentiment (11). The upper panel of ﬁgure 1 depicts equation (12).
1The Euler equation of the risk-free rate in the EU framework under assumption 3 is rf = ρ+ θµ− 12σ2
and recall that we dropped the second order terms.
2Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: https://www.stlouisfed.org.
3The Center for Research in Security Prices, whose data is available at Wharton Research Data Services:
https://wrds-www.wharton.upenn.edu.
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Table 1: Summary statistics of log real per capita consumption growth.
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max N
∆c 0.00125 0.00435 -0.0192 0.0155 719
Monthly data (1959m1-2018m12).
Table 2: Moments in the historical equity premium and risk-free rate Euler equations.
xr q rf µ σ ξ ξ
0.08 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.01 5.0 4.0
Notice that although θ is larger than θEU , the maximum θ is not much higher than 1. Of
course, one can relax this constraint if one assumes that the same α need not satisfy both
the equity-premium and the risk-free rate for any value of γ. The lower panel of ﬁgure 1
depicts equation (9), which coincides with equation (11) if the parameters (θ, ρ) are on the
locus in the upper panel. Thus, any point on the upper and lower panel is consistent with
the set of parameters that satisfy both the equity-premium and the risk-free rate.
The Sentiment CAPM matches the full magnitudes of the historical equity premium and
the risk-free rate even with a small degree of risk aversion (e.g., log utility), and a moderate
degree of ambiguity aversion (e.g., even with an α above 0.4). Leading alternatives to the
CCAPM generate uniform risk aversion and so cannot explain the systematic risk-seeking
behavior toward positively skewed prospects that has been documented in both laboratory
experiments and ﬁnancial markets.
An advantage of our approach is that it can match both the equity premium and risk-free
rate with low risk aversion (e.g., even with θ between 0 and 1). To match the historical equity
premium, asset pricing models often assume an implausibly large degree of risk aversion.
For instance, the long-run risk model (Bansal and Yaron, 2004) assumes a risk-aversion
coeﬁcient of 10 to match the equity premium, and the classical consumption CAPM cannot
even generate ten percent of the historical equity premium with a risk-aversion coeﬃcient of
10 (Mehra and Prescott, 1985).
Models of non-expected utility preferences also struggle to match the observed equity
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Figure 1: The upper panel shows the set of (θ, ρ) that make any point (α, γ) on the lower
panel satisfy both the equity-premium and the risk-free rate.
premium. Chapman and Polkovnichenko (2009) show that representative agent economies for
a wide range of ﬁrst-order risk-averse preferences including risk-averse rank-dependent utility
(Quiggin, 1982), disappointment aversion (Gul, 1991; Routledge and Zin, 2010), loss aversion
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), and ambiguity aversion (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) do
not generate an equity premium greater than 4 percent under any of their calibrations. Pagel
(2016) shows that while the K®szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) model of reference-dependent
preferences can match the equity premium, it generates counterfactually large volatility in
the risk-free rate.
Models of ambiguity aversion do not require substantial risk aversion but instead require
a large degree of ambiguity aversion. For instance, the robust control approach to asset
pricing pioneered by Hansen and Sargent (2001) focuses on the worst-case scenarios, as does
the maxmin multiple priors model of Gilboa and Schmeidler, thereby substituting a large
amount of risk aversion with a large amount of ambiguity aversion. Ju and Miao (2012)
study the smooth model of ambiguity aversion (Klibanoﬀ et al., 2005) in an asset pricing
context which allows in principle for less extreme ambiguity aversion. However, they require
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a relative ambiguity aversion coeﬃcient of more than 8 to match the equity premium.
5 Empirical Study of Sentiment and the Equity Premium
In section 4, we deﬁned the sentiment in equation (8) as the residual that satisﬁes the equity
premium equation in the form of αt = f(xt, qt, rft). Then, we showed that on average, given
that the parameters (θ, ρ) satisfy (12), the same (average) α and γ that satisfy the equity
premium also satisfy the risk-free rate equation. The next natural step is to evaluate the
empirical support for the theory. In particular, if we specify a statistical model for the log
stock-returns, we can construct the time series for xt and qt, using which we can directly
construct αt from (8). Once we construct αt, we can compare it to the monthly survey
data indexes for consumer and investor sentiment. Of course, we do not maintain that there
must be a linear relation between αt and survey indexes, however, the existence of a strong
correlation provides empirical support for the model.
Sentiment indexes: The most used consumer sentiment indexes are the Consumer
Conﬁdence Index (CCI) from the Conference Board4 and the Consumer Sentiment Index
(ICS) from the University of Michigan5. The most widely used investor sentiment data is
constructed by Baker and Wurgler (2006), and consists of two indexes: the Baker-Wurgler
(BW) index and the Orthogonal Baker-Wurgler (BW⊥) index, where the second index is
constructed similarly to the ﬁrst but the business cycle variations are removed.6 We also use
the market bullish (Bull) and bearish (Bear) sentiment indexes from the American Associ-
ation of Individual Investors7, where the Bull index can be treated as an index of investor
optimism.
Our sample period spans more than three decades of monthly data from November 1987
through December 2018. It contains the dot-com bubble of the late 1990's, the housing
bubble of the early 2000's the great recession of 2007 to 2009, and two of the longest U.S.
4https://www.conference-board.org/data/consumerconfidence.cfm
5http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/
6Data available at: http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jwurgler/
7https://www.aaii.com/sentimentsurvey
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business cycle expansions. The sample period starts the month following the October 1987
stock market crash as the post-crash period may reﬂect a regime-change in how the market
prices disaster risk. As Rubinstein (1994) remarks, "One is tempted to hypothesize that
the stock market crash of October 1987 changed the way market participants viewed index
options." Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1996) similarly note: "it is now well known that since
the 1987 crash, Black-Scholes implied volatilities for S&P 500 Index options have consis-
tently exhibited pronounced smile eﬀects - a fact that can perhaps be best explained by
extreme departures from lognormality." Hence, the post-1987 crash period seems particu-
larly appropriate for our setting where the representative agent truncates and overweights
the tails of the return distribution, producing a risk-neutral distribution that is asymmetric
and fat-tailed.
The risk-aversion parameter that we use to construct αt is θ = 1. Importantly, the log
utility allows us to use the nominal market return, risk-free rate and consumption growth.
Henceforth, we do not need to use the inﬂation data and the series rt and rft are nominal.
In order to construct xt and qt from the data, we use a simple Generalized AutoRe-
gressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model (Bollerslev, 1986). In section 6,
we show that having an EU-Hurwicz agent implies return predictability. Speciﬁcally, the
price-dividend ratio must predict the market return. The GARCH(1,1) model that we use
for the log returns is
rt = θ0 + θ1pdt−1 + t
t = qtzt, zt ∼ N .I.D(0, 1)
q2t = ω0 + α1
2
t−1 + β1q
2
t−1,
where we refer to α1 and β1 as our ARCH and GARCH terms respectively. This model
implies that the current price-dividend ratio gives us the expected value of the next period
return (xt = θ0 + θ1pdt) and its conditional standard deviation is qt. The market return
and risk-free rate data are from Kenneth French's web page8, where we used the monthly
data from the ﬁle containing the Fama-French three factors, and rt = ln(1 + Mktt). We
8https://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
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used Robert Shiller's web page9 for the data on prices and dividends, and constructed the
price-dividend ratio as pdt =
Pt
Dt
. The GARCH(1,1) model yields signiﬁcant predictability
even up to a year (see table 8), however, the one-month lag model yields marginally more
signiﬁcant results. Table 9 shows that the Akaike and Bayasian information criteria select
the GARCH(1,1) model over models with more ARCH and GARCH terms. The estimated
expected market return (xt) and its standards deviation (qt) based on the GARCH(1,1) model
are plotted in ﬁgure 6 in Appendix C. Consistent with the literature (Cochrane, 2017), the
expected market return and its conditional standard deviation are countercyclical.
Having constructed (xt, qt) and given that we have rft, we can use (8) to construct αt.
Note that θ = 1 implies ρ = rf − µ+ σ xr
q
via (12), where everything on the right hand side
is a data moment10 and the monthly data yields ρ = 0.000032. Finally, we use γ = 0.8,
which constitutes a relatively small deviation from the EU framework and which satisﬁes
the inequalities associated with basic behavioral anomalies that we discuss in section 7.
Importantly, the qualitative results do not depend on the exact value of γ, and any value of
γ between 0.7 to 0.9 roughly produces the same results.
High sentiment periods are often associated with historical accounts of speculative bub-
bles and subsequent crashes. We next consider whether our derived sentiment index can
track market indexes during the two most recent bubbles in the United States: the dot-com
bubble of the early 2000's and the subsequent housing bubble. Figure 2 shows the estimated
theoretical αt, and the months of salient index values during the two most recent bubble
episodes: the dot-com bubble and burst, and the housing bubble and burst. From the ﬁgure,
we see that the derived sentiment measure is near its peak when the NASDAQ peaked in
March 2000, and that the sentiment measure had fallen sharply around the time the NAS-
DAQ reached its trough in October 2002. The sentiment measure also experienced a jump
upward after the Dow Jones surpassed 14,000 for the ﬁrst time in July, 2007, and experienced
a sharp decline when the Dow Jones lost 20% of its value, dropping below 12,000 in March,
2008, the same month which marked the ﬁrst failure of a major investment bank involved in
the subprime mortgage crisis (Bear Stearns).
9http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.xls
10Table 10 reports the summary statistics for the model's variables and estimates.
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b: DotCom: NASDAQ low   
c: Housing: DJ above 14k
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Figure 2: Estimated theoretical sentiment αt directly from the equity premium equation (8)
with maximum and minimum.
Table 3 reports the correlation coeﬃcient between αt and the survey-based consumer
and investor sentiment indexes. The table reveals that the theoretical sentiment index αt
is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with the major sentiment indexes in the literature.
This provides strong support for the interpretation of αt as a sentiment index, and for the
existence of a link between sentiment and the residual of the Euler equation for the equity
premium needed to bridge the gap between the CCAPM and the data.
The consumer sentiment indexes on average have a higher correlation with αt. Further
inspection reveals that their correlation is higher during business cycle expansions. Thus, it
seems αt better describes changes in positive (bullish) sentiment compared to negative (bear-
ish) sentiment. For instance, over the period between the two NBER recessions (1991m4-
2001m3) which covers one of the longest U.S. economic expansions, the correlation of αt
with CCI and ICS rises to 0.88 and 0.79 respectively. Table 11 in appendix C contains more
information regarding the correlations among αt, sentiment indexes and model variables.
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Table 3: Correlation coeﬃcients between survey based consumer and investor sentiment
indexes and the theoretical index α.
sentiment index corr(α, ·)
cci 0.48∗∗∗
ics 0.40∗∗∗
bw 0.36∗∗∗
bw⊥ 0.35∗∗∗
bull 0.27∗∗∗
bear −0.09
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
5.1 A Three-Factor Model of Systematic Sentiment
Denoting a survey-based sentiment index by at, we expect to have at = A(αt) + t, where
t is the measurement error, and equation (8) in general allows for at = g
(
xt, qt, rft
)
+ t.
As mentioned in the previous section, it is not necessary for A(·) to be linear. Given that x
linearly depends on the pd ratio, in this section, we explore the empirical performance of a
linear g
(
pdt, rft, qt
)
to construct a simple three-factor model of systematic sentiment. With-
out loss of generality, we normalize all the survey-based indexes a ∈ {cci, ics, bw, bw⊥, bull}
and variables pdt, rft, qt to have mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Table 4 reports
the performance of regressions
at = λ1 pdt + λ2 rft + λ3 qt + t,
for the above sentiment indexes, and for comparison the ﬁrst column reports the same
regression for the theoretical α from the previous section. The linear three factor model
yields impressive results for the consumer sentiment indexes, explaining 62% and 52% of the
variation in CCI and ICS, respectively. Moreover, the size of the coeﬃcients are similar to
the theoretical α. The R2 of the investor sentiment indexes are somewhat lower, yet the t
statistics of the pd ratio and rf are about 9 for the BW indexes. As we saw in the previous
section, restriction of the model to economic expansion periods signiﬁcantly improves its ﬁt
for the consumer sentiment indexes. Table 5 shows the R2 of the three-factor model when
20
Table 4: Three fundamental factors of the sentiment indexes.
α cci ics bw bw⊥ bull
pd 0.849∗∗∗ 0.602∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗
(61.31) (18.36) (16.02) (9.10) (9.90) (7.29)
rf 0.353
∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.0293
(25.65) (16.15) (11.50) (9.04) (8.83) (0.60)
q 0.336∗∗∗ -0.291∗∗∗ -0.325∗∗∗ -0.0167 -0.126∗∗∗ -0.0104
(24.52) (-8.93) (-8.95) (-0.38) (-2.87) (-0.21)
R2 0.93 0.62 0.52 0.28 0.30 0.13
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Monthly data (1987m11-2018m12).
we restrict the time period to economic expansion of the 1990s' (1991m4-2001m3) and the
post great recession era (2009m7-2018m12), where the simple three factor model explains
between 77% and 62% of the variation in the consumer sentiment indexes. Overall, the ﬁt of
the model regarding investor sentiment indexes seem consistent during economic expansion
subsamples and the whole sample. Figure 3 shows the performance of the three-factor model
by plotting both the sentiment indexes and their predicted values for the whole sample. The
same graph for the post great recession period is presented in ﬁgure 7 of Appendix B. Overall,
the simple three-factor model captures the movements of the consumer sentiment indexes
and trends of the investor sentiment indexes very well.
Table 5: The three-factor model of sentiment's ﬁt during economic expansions.
cci ics bw bw⊥ bull
2009m7  2018m12
R2 0.77 0.62 0.35 0.26 0.098
1991m4  2001m3
R2 0.69 0.64 0.28 0.25 0.16
To the extent that empirical measures of sentiment are attempting to identify similar
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Figure 3: Sentiment indexes and their predicted values using the three-factor model.
underlying constructs, they should (on average) all point in the same direction. That is,
they should have signiﬁcant positive correlations. Importantly, our analysis suggests that
once we identify the systematic sentiment factors in the empirical measures and remove them,
the residuals need not be correlated anymore. We ﬁnd that our three factors are systematic
in this sense. Table 6 shows the correlations among the sentiment indexes ﬁrst and then
the residuals of sentiment indexes once we remove the three factors. Clearly, there is a high
correlation among the consumer sentiment indexes CCI and ICS, and the investor sentiment
indexes BW and BW⊥. But there is also a large and signiﬁcant correlation of about 0.30
among the consumer sentiment indexes and the investor sentiment indexes as shown in the
top panel of Table 6. As predicted, these correlations are no longer positive (and in fact
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become negative and signiﬁcant) once we remove the three factors, (pdt, rft, and qt). The
correlation of Bull with the other sentiment indexes also becomes negative or insigniﬁcant.
Thus, after removing the three factors from the sentiment indexes, they point in opposite
directions and the residuals can hardly be interpreted as systematic sentiment indexes.
Sibley et al. (2016) show that a set of 13 macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables including
the 3-month Treasury Bill rate, the dividend yield and stock market volatility collectively
explain over 60% of the variation in the Baker-Wurgler sentiment index. Our approach is
motivated by theory, which relates sentiment to a narrower set of three fundamental variables,
and we ﬁnd that these three variables are suﬃcient to remove the systematic component of
sentiment from the sentiment indexes.
Table 6: Correlation coeﬃcients among sentiment indexes, and residuals of sentiment indexes
once three-factors are removed.
cci ics bw bw⊥ bull
cci 1.00
ics 0.92∗∗∗ 1.00
bw 0.30∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 1.00
bw ⊥ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 1.00
bull 0.09∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 1.00
ccires icsres bwres bw
⊥
res bullres
ccires 1.00
icsres 0.82
∗∗∗ 1.00
bwres −0.18∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗ 1.00
bw⊥res −0.23∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 1.00
bullres −0.17∗∗∗ −0.04 −0.03 −0.03 1.00
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Monthly data (1987m112018m12)
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6 Sentiment and the Aggregate Stock Market
In addition to providing a resolution to the equity premium puzzle, the Sentiment CAPM
predicts other documented eﬀects of sentiment on the aggregate stock market. Here we
show that (i) changes in α generate return predictability in the price/dividend ratio, (ii)
a positive α produces a non-monotonic (U-shaped) pricing kernel, (iii) an increase in α
diminishes the positive relationship between the equity premium and market volatility, (iv)
the market Sharpe ratio is higher in low sentiment periods, (v) an increase in α decreases the
premium for bearing tail risk, and (vi) a decrease in α produces greater negative skewness
in the market's risk-neutral probability density. Return predictability of the price/dividend
ratio is a classic ﬁnding supported by Campbell and Shiller (1988). U-shaped pricing kernels
are supported, for instance, by Sichert (2018). Predictions (iii) and (iv) are supported
empirically by Yu and Yuan (2011). Prediction (v) is supported by Chevapatrakul et al.
(2019). Prediction (vi) is supported by Han (2007).
6.1 Sentiment and Return Predictability of the P/D Ratio
Consider a Lucas-tree economy with an EU-Hurwicz representative agent that has a time-
separable constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility of consumption. There is a tree
that distributes its dividend every period, and its shares belong to the agent. Assuming that
pt is the ex-dividend price at time t, the representative agent's problem is
max
st,ct
E˜t
∞∑
j=0
βj
c1−θt+j
1− θ
ct + stpt = st−1(dt + pt).
Note that the expected value E˜t is based on the EU-Hurwicz probability weighting.
The ﬁrst order condition of the representative agent is
E˜tβ
(ct+1
ct
)−θ(pt+1 + dt+1
pt
)
= 1.
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The uncertainty that originates from the future dividends dt+1, aﬀects the future return
Rt+1 =
pt+1+dt+1
pt
. We can show that consumption is a fraction of wealth that depends on the
expected return and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS).
Proposition 9. In the Lucas-tree environment with an EU-Hurwicz representative agent and
a CRRA utility function with θ 6= 1, the price-dividend ratio pdt ≡ ptdt and the expected return
EtRt+1 move in opposite directions in response to a permanent or mean-revering change in
sentiment.
Proof. See appendix A.
Hence, movements in sentiment imply return predictability for pdt with a negative sign
11.
6.2 Sentiment and the Pricing Kernel Puzzle
The pricing kernel puzzle (see Cuesdeanu and Jackwerth (2018) for a review) is the empirical
ﬁnding that the pricing kernel or stochastic discount factor is not monotonically decreasing
in the market return, but rather increases at the right tail of the distribution, generating a
U-shape (e.g., Bakshi et al. (2010), Sichert (2018)). Here we show that the Sentiment CAPM
predicts a U-shaped pricing kernel and generates the novel prediction that the pricing kernel
should have a more pronounced U shape in high sentiment periods. Consistent with this
prediction, Driessen et al. (2019) empirically investigate the time variation of the pricing
kernel and report, "the U-shape is stronger in good times than in bad times. The stronger
U-shaped pricing kernel indicates that investors are more sensitive towards large negative
and positive returns in good times" (p. 3).
Driessen et al. (2019) show that standard asset pricing models including the habit model
of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), the long-run risk model of Bansal and Yaron (2004), and
the rare disaster models of Gabaix (2012) and Wachter (2013) each produce a monotonically
decreasing pricing kernel when projecting the pricing kernel onto the market return, and thus
11The restriction θ 6= 1 is a special consequence of the Lucas tree structure. If there are other income
sources for the representative agent, predictability can also occur with θ = 1.
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cannot explain the U shape. Using the behavioral asset pricing framework of Shefrin (2008),
Barone-Adesi et al. (2017) argue for a pricing kernel that has an inverted U-shape, arising
from an overconﬁdent representative agent that underweights the tails of the distribution.
This inverted U-shape is contrary to the U-shape estimated in several recent empirical studies
of the pricing kernel (Bakshi et al., 2010; Sichert, 2018; Driessen et al., 2019).
In the Lucas-tree environment, consumption growth approximately equals the wealth
growth that in turn approximately equals the market return. As a result, the pricing kernel
with the EU-Hurwicz representative agent in terms of the market return has a U-shape.
Moreover, the functional form of the stochastic discount factor reveals that the higher the
sentiment, the steeper the increasing part of the pricing kernel. Also, the location of the
increasing part of the pricing kernel depends on the expected market return and its volatility.
Corollary 10 summarizes this result.
Corollary 10. In the Lucas-tree environment with an EU-Hurwicz representative agent with
a CRRA utility function, the pricing kernel has a U-shape in returns. Moreover,
1. the higher the sentiment (αt), the more pronounced the U-shape. That is, the increasing
part is steeper.
2. the location of the increasing part of the pricing kernel (Rt+1) depends positively on the
expected market return (xt) and the conditional market volatility (qt).
Proof. Replacing the consumption growth with the market return in the EU-Hurwicz agent
stochastic discount factor and continuing with the assuming that the representative agent
truncates the support at [R,R] yields
Mt+1 =

γβR−θt+1 + (1− γ)(1− αt)βR−θt+1 if Rt+1 = Rt+1
γβR−θt+1 if Rt+1 ∈ (Rt+1, Rt+1)
γβR
−θ
t+1 + (1− γ)αtβR−θt+1 if Rt+1 = Rt+1.
(13)
The probability weights above clearly show that the pricing kernel is U-shaped in R. More-
over, a higher αt indicates a larger increase on the right side of the pricing kernel. For
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the second part of the corollary, the conditional log-normality of the market return with
lnRt+1 ∼ N (xt, q2t ), and the truncation assumption at ξqt, yield Rt+1 = ext+ξqt .
Graph 4 depicts the pricing kernel (13) in which αt is calculated from (8), with ξ = 4,
and ξ = 5, and xt and qt are from the GARCH(1,1) estimation of the return in the previous
section. Speciﬁcally, in the right panels γ = 0.8 (similar to ﬁgure 2). In this case, the
highest αt depicted in the top-right panel equals 0.70, at which point xt = −0.0044 and
qt = 0.045. In the bottom-right panel, the lowest αt equals 0.30, at which point xt = 0.015
and qt = 0.026. In the middle-right panel, we used the time average values of αt, xt, and
qt, that respectively equal α = 0.45, x = 0.0095 and q = 0.041. In the top-left panel, the
highest αt equals 0.62, and average α = 0.51 and the lowest αt = 0.43. Values of xt and
qt for each left-right pair of panels are the same. Notice that specifying a lower value for γ
results in a drop in the variation of αt as expected.
6.3 Sentiment and the Mean-Variance Relation
French et al. (1987) ﬁnd that there is a volatility premium for the aggregate stock market:
the equity premium is larger in times of higher market volatility. Under the Sentiment
CAPM, a decrease in γ increases the eﬀect of stock market volatility and raises the equity
premium provided that sentiment is not too high. We establish that the Sentiment CAPM
generates a volatility premium in the following corollary:
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Figure 4: Pricing kernel of the EU-Hurwicz representative agent. The values of xt and qt are
the estimates from the GARCH(1,1) model, and ξ = 4, ξ = 5, θ = 1. The right panels are
based on γ = 0.8, and the implied highest, average, and lowest values of αt. The left panels
are based on γ = 0.6, and the implied highest, average, and lowest values of αt. Values of xt
and qt for each left-right pair of panels are the same.
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Corollary 11. (Volatility Premium): With an EH-Hurwicz representative agent and under
assumptions 3-5, the equity premium increases with market volatility qt if the agent is not
too optimistic (i.e., αt ≤ ξξ+ξ ).
Proof. Under the EU-Hurwicz representative agent and assumptions 3-5, the equity premium
is the right-hand side of (7):
EPt = ηθσqt(1 + xt +
1
2
q2t )−
1− γ
γ
[
αt
(
1− 1
2
θ2σ2 − θξσ)(xrt + ξqt) + (1− αt)(1− 1
2
θ2σ2 + θξσ
)
(xrt − ξqt)
]
.
The change in the equity premium in response to an increase in qt is:
∂EPt
∂qt
=ηθσ(1 + xt +
3
2
q2t )+(
1− γ
γ
)(
θσ
(
ξ2 − (ξ2 − ξ2)αt
)
+
(
1− 1
2
θ2σ2
)(
ξ − (ξ + ξ)αt
))
.
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side is always positive. In the second term, since 1
2
θ2σ2 < 1
for all the relevant calibrations, it is enough to have αt ≤ ξξ+ξ .
The condition αt ≤ ξξ+ξ is natural and consistent with an overall bias toward ambiguity
aversion.
Yu and Yuan (2011) ﬁnd that the volatility premium is smaller in periods of higher
sentiment. This relationship is also predicted by the Sentiment CAPM.
Corollary 12. With an EH-Hurwicz representative agent and under assumptions 3-5, the
volatility premium (the increase in the equity premium in times of greater market volatility)
is decreasing in sentiment αt .
Proof. See appendix A.
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6.4 Sentiment and the Market Sharpe Ratio
Equation (9) shows that sentiment is (approximately) a function of the market Sharpe ratio
with a negative sign. Hence, we have the following immediate corollary:
Corollary 13. (The Sharpe Ratio and Sentiment): With an EU-Hurwicz representative
agent and under assumption 3-5 and up to the ﬁrst order, the Sharpe ratio is higher in low
sentiment periods (low α).
Corollary 13 is a strong and novel prediction of our analysis. This prediction is also
supported empirically. In their empirical study, Yu and Yuan (2011) estimated market
volatility with four diﬀerent volatility models and they consistently observed higher Sharpe
ratios in low sentiment periods as predicted by (9). These Sharpe ratios are economically
large, ranging from 1.08 to 2.00 for low sentiment periods across their four volatility models
for equal-weighted returns and from 0.83 to 2.12 for value-weighted returns. With the current
EU-Hurwicz calibration, such Sharpe ratios can be achieved if the sentiment falls to about
50% of its mean value.
6.5 Sentiment and the Tail-Risk Premium
Recent studies have documented a tail risk premium for the aggregate stock market: the
equity premium is larger when the market has a fatter left tail, and the tail risk premium
is smaller in periods of higher sentiment (Chevapatrakul et al., 2019). In the cross-section,
Chabi-Yo et al. (2018) (in their Table 4) ﬁnd that the Baker-Wurgler sentiment index is
signiﬁcantly negatively related to the premium on stocks with strong lower-tail dependence
with the market return. The Sentiment CAPM predicts the existence of a tail risk premium
as well as its dependence on sentiment. The following corollary immediately follows from
equation (5).
Corollary 14. (Tail Risk Premium): With an EU-Hurwicz representative agent, the equity
premium increases in times of greater tail risk (lower worst-case scenario, Rt+1). Moreover,
this tail risk premium is decreasing in the sentiment αt .
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6.6 Sentiment and the Risk-Neutral Distribution
Intuitively, a smaller α that is consistent with a more pessimistic EU-Hurwicz representa-
tive agent, leads to greater negative skewness of the risk-neutral probability density. In
other words, the skewness of the risk-neutral probability density is increasing in α. The
following corollary shows that this is indeed the case provided that the consumption growth
distribution is not too dispersed (as in the log-normal distribution).
Corollary 15. If the standard deviation of the consumption growth process is suﬃciently
small, and γ is suﬃciently large, then the skewness of the risk-neutral distribution for the
EU-Hurwicz representative agent is increasing in sentiment αt.
Proof. See appendix A.
The ﬁrst condition in Corollary 15 is natural and the second is very plausible. As Freeman
(2004) notes, Aggregate consumption growth has exhibited very low volatility over the past
century (p. 927), consistent with a small volatility of consumption growth assumed in
Corollary 15. A value of γ that is suﬃciently high is consistent with our ﬁnding that only
a small deviation from the CCAPM (e.g., γ = 0.8) is needed to generate the full magnitude
of the historical equity premium. As we show in section 7, similarly small deviations from
EU (high values of γ < 1) are suﬃcient to explain prominent behavioral anomalies from
economics laboratory experiments.
The monotonic relationship between sentiment and risk-neutral skewness that is predicted
in Corollary 10 has empirical support. In particular, Han (2007) studies whether investor
sentiment aﬀects the prices of S&P 500 index options. He observes that the risk-neutral
skewness of the monthly index return is more (less) negative when market sentiment becomes
more bearish (bullish) (p. 387). This observation holds under the Sentiment CAPM since
a decrease in α reﬂects more pessimistic (bearish) sentiment, and Corollary 15 shows that
as α decreases, the risk-neutral skewness becomes more negative.
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7 Microfoundations
The Sentiment CAPM provides a bridge between behavioral biases in individual choice and
aggregate stock market anomalies by linking sentiment to prospect theory. In this section
we consider the microfoundations for the Sentiment CAPM.
7.1 The Representative Agent and Microeconomic Data
The representative agent in asset pricing models often bears little resemblance to subjects
in economic laboratory experiments. First, the representative agent in asset pricing models
is often far more risk-averse than subjects in laboratory studies. Second, the representative
agent is often assumed to satisfy the expected utility axioms and to be risk-averse or risk-
neutral. Such an agent does not exhibit the commonly observed choice patterns that violate
the independence axiom or the assumption of uniform risk aversion. We show that the
EU-Hurwicz agent calibrated from Section 4 to match the historical equity premium and
the risk-free rate also exhibits systematic violations of the indendence axiom and systematic
deviations from risk aversion that are observed in experiments.
Following the application to behavioral anomalies, we further investigate the microfoun-
dations of EU-Hurwicz preferences by considering its implications for expected utiltiy anoma-
lies in individual ﬁnancial decisions, and establishing an aggregation result in which markets
where agents have heterogeneous subjective probability beliefs and heterogeneous ambiguity
attitudes can give rise to a representative EU-Hurwicz under certain conditions.
7.1.1 The Allais Paradox over Large and Small Stakes
We next apply the parameter values for EU-Hurwicz preferences that were calibrated in
Section 4 to match both the equity premium and the risk-free rate, to three robust ﬁndings
from economics lab experiments: The Allais paradox (Allais, 1953), the common ratio eﬀect
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), and the fourfold pattern of risk preferences (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992). We ﬁnd that the calibrated values from Section 4 resolve these behavioral
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Table 7: The Allais Paradox
Choice 1 Choice 2
A (x, p; y, 1− q; 0, q − p) A' (x, p; 0, 1− p)
B (y, 1) B' (y, q; 0, 1− p)
anomalies and also predict the observed stake-dependence of the Allais paradox that has been
documented in the literature.
The Allais paradox (also known as the common consequence eﬀect) is among the best-
known systematic empirical violations of EU. The eﬀect has been documented over large
stakes (Allais, 1953; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), but is not observed over small stakes
(Fan, 2002; Huck and Müller, 2012). The Allais paradox involves two choices, each between
a pair of lotteries with known probabilities. The form of these choices is shown in Table 7,
where x > y and q > p: The lottery (x, p; y, 1 − q; 0, q − p) oﬀers prize x with probability
p, prize y with probability 1 − q, and a payoﬀ of 0 with probability q − p (with analogous
notation used for the other lotteries). In the classic version of the paradox, y = $1 million,
x = $5 million, q = 0.11, and p = 0.10. Allais found that many people prefer B in Choice
1 which oﬀers $1 million with certainty, over lottery A, but prefer A' in Choice 2 which
oﬀers a chance at a larger prize. This pattern of preferences violates EU since lotteries A'
and B' are constructed from lotteries A and B, respectively, by replacing an 89% chance of
$1 million with an 89% chance of $0. The observed reversal in preference violates the EU
independence axiom.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) replicated Allais' ﬁnding with more modest stakes, setting
(x, y, p, q) = ($2500, $2400, 0.33, 0.34). They found that most of their experimental subjects
preferred B in Choice 1 and A' in Choice 2. Fan (2002) employed smaller stakes, setting
(x, y, p, q) = ($100, $20, 0.10, 0.11) and found that at such stakes, the Allais paradox largely
disappears. Huck and Müller (2012) employed even smaller stakes, setting (x, y, p, q) =
($25, $5, 0.10, 0.11). They also found little evidence of the Allais preference pattern. Instead,
Fan and Huck and Muller found that people typically chose the two riskier lotteries in both
choices. There is a strong intuition for observing the paradox at the large stakes used
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by Allais and Kahneman and Tversky and for not observing the paradox at small stakes:
gambling when a sure $1 million or even a sure $2400 is on the table is less attractive than
gambling when the sure option is $5 or even $20. When no sure option is on the table,
the larger diﬀerence in payoﬀs outweighs the 0.01 diﬀerence in probabilities, resulting in the
selection of lottery A' in Choice 2. A complete explanation of the Allais paradox should
then explain the occurrence of the paradox (choosing B and A') at the large stakes used by
Allais and Kahneman and Tversky and the selection of A and A' at the small stakes used by
Fan and Huck and Muller. The most widely used form of cumulative prospect theory with
a power value function deﬁned over gains and losses (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) cannot
explain this full pattern, even allowing for any probability weighting function (Schneider
and Day, 2016). In contrast, the EU-Hurwicz model with log utility deﬁned over wealth can
simultaneously explain the paradox at large and small stakes.
Figure 5 shows values of γ and levels of wealth for which the EU-Hurwicz model cali-
bration from Section 4 that matches both the historical equity premium and the risk-free
rate also simultaneously explains the observed stake dependence of the Allais paradox in the
above four experiments, as well as classic experimental versions of the common ratio eﬀect
and the fourfold pattern of risk preferences discussed in the following subsections.
7.1.2 The Common Ratio Eﬀect
The EU-Hurwicz agent calibrated to match the equity premium and risk-free rate in section
4 also exhibits the classical form of the common ratio eﬀect, a diﬀerent violation of inde-
pendence, in which a person prefers $3000 with certainty over an 80% chance of $4000, but
prefers a 20% chance of $4000 over a 25% chance of $3000 (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
7.1.3 The Fourfold Pattern of Risk Attitudes
While the Allais paradox and common ratio eﬀect demonstrate how observed behavior sys-
tematically violates the EU independence axiom, the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes (Tver-
sky and Kahneman, 1992) provides a classic demonstration of how observed behavior system-
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Figure 5: Regions of wealth and parameter γ that simultaneously resolve three behavioral
anomalies (the Allais paradox, common ratio eﬀect, and fourfold pattern) and match both
the equity premium and the risk-free rate. The left panel emphasizes large wealth levels
while the right panel emphasizes very small wealth levels. As the ﬁgure shows, higher values
of γ are needed for higher values of wealth.
atically deviates from risk aversion. Under the fourfold pattern, a decision maker exhibits
risk aversion for gains of high probability and losses of low probability, while exhibiting risk-
seeking behavior for gains of low probability and losses of high probability. As an illustration,
Tversky and Kahneman found that most of their experimental subjects preferred (i) receiv-
ing $95 with certainty over a 95% chance of winning $100; (ii) losing $5 with certainty over
a 5% chance of losing $100; receiving a 5% chance of winning $100 over $5 with certainty;
(iii) taking a 95% chance of losing $100 over losing $95 with certainty. In each case, the
complementary probability corresponded to an outcome of $0. The fourfold pattern is also
a robust prediction of the representative EU-Hurwicz agent as shown in Figure 5.
7.2 Expected Utility Violations in Financial Decisions
We next show that the EU-Hurwicz agent also explains empirical violations of EU in in-
vestment and insurance decisions. Consider the static problem of an EU-Hurwicz agent who
is deciding how much to insure against a stochastic loss, L with maximum loss Ls and a
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best-case scenario of no loss. The agent is charged an insurance premium of ky where y is
the premium for purchasing full insurance. The agent chooses the level of insurance coverage
k ∈ [0, 1] that maximizes (14) where u is strictly increasing, concave, and twice diﬀerentiable.
γEu(w − ky − (1− k)Ls) + (1− γ) [αu(w − ky) + (1− α)u(w − ky − (1− k)Ls)]. (14)
Note that (14) can be written as
γEu(m + xrs) + (1− γ) [αu(m + xrs) + (1− α)u(m + xrs)] . (15)
where m = w − y , x = 1−k and the payoﬀ in state s is rs = y − Ls . As noted by Armantier
et al. (2018), this change in notation demonstrates that the coinsurance demand model of
Mossin (1968) is equivalent to the portfolio choice model of Pratt (1964). Both of these
classical models were developed for the expected utility case (γ = 1).
In (15), x is the amount invested in a risky asset (such as the market portfolio). The
optimal solution to (15) solves (16):
γE[u ′(m + xrs)rs ] + (1− γ) [αu ′(m + xrs)rs + (1− α)u ′(m + xrs)rs ] = 0. (16)
When γ = 1, we arrive at the well-known implication of EU that x > 0 if and only if the
risky asset has a positive expected payoﬀ, regardless of the agent's degree of risk aversion.
This general implication of EU is contrary to the empirical ﬁnding that many households
have limited or no participation in the stock market (Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991), despite the
large positive expected return on stocks.
When γ = 1, we also arrive at the well-known implication of EU that k < 1 (it is not
optimal to purchase full insurance) regardless of the degree of risk aversion if the premium
is not actuarially fair (y > E (Ls)), in contrast to the large premiums many households are
willing to pay to eliminate risk.
The EU-Hurwicz model provides an explanation for both the limited participation puzzle
and the limited insurance puzzle. To illustrate, let γ < 1 and let E[rs ] = 0. Then, for
suﬃciently low α, (16) turns negative if rs < 0 as more weight is shifted to the lowest payoﬀ.
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It follows that for a risky asset with suﬃciently small but positive expected payoﬀ, and
suﬃciently small α, an EU-Hurwicz agent will choose not to invest in the asset (x = 0). It is
also straightforward to show that the amount invested in the risky asset is increasing in α.
These predictions are supported by Dimmock et al. (2016) who ﬁnd a negative relationship
between ambiguity aversion and stock market participation, and by Angelini and Cavapozzi
(2017) who ﬁnd that optimism is positively related to both stock ownership and the share
of wealth invested in stocks. Equivalently, when α is suﬃciently low, an EU-Hurwicz agent
will purchase full insurance (k = 1) even in cases where the premium is not actuarially fair.
7.3 Aggregation
We next establish an aggregation result in proposition 17 which provides conditions such
that a market of EU-Hurwicz agents with heterogeneous subjective probability beliefs and
heterogeneous ambiguity attitudes has the same prices as a market with a representative
EU-Hurwicz agent. This latter interpretation of proposition 17 links behavioral biases in
individual choice to aggregate stock market anomalies.
We also provide a corollary to proposition 17 in which a market with some EU agents
and some noise traders (modeled as Hurwicz agents) with heterogeneous ambiguity attitudes
has the same prices as a diﬀerent market with a representative agent that has a prospect
theory probability weighting function (in particular, a representative EU-Hurwicz agent).
Consider a Lucas tree economy with a risky asset and a risk-free asset that is of zero
aggregate supply. The economy is populated with a unit measure of EU-Hurwicz agents that
trade based on their subjective probability distributions and ambiguity attitudes, both of
which can vary across agents. Let Eit denote the expectation operator for agent i ∈ [0, 1],
let αit denote the ambiguity attitude (degree of optimism for agent i ∈ [0, 1]) and let γit
denote the degree of uncertainty perceived by agent i. Suppose that one share of the risky
asset that is valued at Pt bears the stochastic dividend Dt+1 with the ex-dividend price Pt+1
next period. The risk-free asset has a payoﬀ of one, and is priced at P bt .
Deﬁnition 16. A representative agent is deﬁned such that if the measure one of traders is
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substituted with the representative agent, the prices of the risky and riskless assets remain
the same.
Proposition 17. Consider a market of EU-Hurwicz agents with heterogeneous expectations
Eit, heterogeneous ambiguity attitudes αit, heterogeneous perceptions of uncertainty, γit and
logarithmic utility of consumption. Let there be no short-selling and let agents have the same
temporal discount rate β and the same expected value for the inverse of the aggregate dividend
growth. Then there exists a representative agent.
Proof. See appendix A.
In general, an EU-Hurwicz agent is not equivalent to an EU agent with a speciﬁc prob-
ability weighting. The reason is that for the EU-Hurwicz agent the best and worst-case
scenarios can reverse if the EU-Hurwicz agent takes a short position. In which case the
optimism and pessimism weights reverse and cannot be interpreted as probabilities that
are assigned to states. However, in the economy we consider, imposing the constraint that
agents cannot sell short does not aﬀect the equilibrium since in equilibrium the agents do
not sell short. Under this no short-selling constraint, an EU-Hurwicz agent in the economy
we consider is formally equivalent to an EU agent that puts additional probability weight
on the two extreme outcomes of the distribution.
An EU-Hurwicz agent is deﬁned in Deﬁnition 1. For this part, we separately deﬁne an
EU agent and a Hurwicz agent for the cases where γ = 1 and γ = 0, respectively. (with
logarithmic utility). A Hurwicz agent does not have beliefs represented by a unique subjective
probability distribution and instead chooses entirely based on optimism or pessimism by
maximizing a convex combination of the best and worst-case utilities across states.
Corollary 18. Consider a market with measure γ of EU agents and measure 1 − γ of
Hurwicz agents with ambiguity attitude αt who satisfy the conditions in Proposition 17. If
there is no short-selling, then the market has the same equilibrium prices as an economy with
a representative EU-Hurwicz agent.
As an example, consider the case of log-normal returns, where lnRt+1 = rm,t+1 has a
conditional normal distribution with rm,t+1 ∼ N (µ, σt). Note that DtDt+1 = [βRt+1]−1 because
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Rt+1 =
Pt+1+Dt+1
Pt
= Dt+1
βDt
. Thus, a Hurwicz agent who truncates the left and right tails of
N (µ, σt) at µ− ξσt and µ+ ξσt, assigns the expected value
Eh,t
Dt
Dt+1
=
1
β
Eh,te
−rm,t+1 =
1
β
(
1− µ+ (− αtξ + (1− αt)ξ)σt) ,
where the subjective probability of the right tail is αt, and the last equation uses the ap-
proximation ex ≈ 1 + x. On the other hand, an EU agent that uses the true probability has
the following expected value
Et
Dt
Dt+1
=
1
β
Ete
−rm,t+1 =
1
β
(
1− µ+ 1
2
σ2t
)
.
Thus, for a representative agent to exist, we need sentiment αt to satisfy
1
2
σt = (1− αt)ξ − αtξ.
Now consider an EU-Hurwicz agent with the following speciﬁcation
E˜t
Dt
Dt+1
=
1
β
E˜te
−rm,t+1 =
1
β
(
γEte
−rm,t+1 + (1− γ)Eh,te−rm,t+1
)
.
This speciﬁcation clearly satisﬁes the condition of proposition 17, and hence, can be thought
of as a representative agent.
8 Conclusion
We conducted the ﬁrst empirical study of the Sentiment CAPM and ﬁnd encouraging results:
The sentiment parameter, α, in the model is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with the
leading empirical sentiment indexes. The Sentiment CAPM generates the full magnitude of
the historical equity premium and produces a low and stable risk-free rate, even with low
risk aversion (e.g., log utility), even with a small deviation from EU (e.g., with γ = 0.8)
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and even with a small degree of ambiguity aversion (e.g., with α above 0.4).12 The model
predicts three fundamental economic quantities to be systematic determinants of sentiment:
the risk-free rate, the price/dividend ratio, and the conditional stock market volatility. We
used these quantities to construct a simple three-factor model of systematic sentiment and
ﬁnd that these quantities jointly explain roughly 30% to 60% of the variation in the leading
sentiment indexes. We also found that while the consumer and investor sentiment indexes
are positively correlated, the residuals of these indexes become uncorrelated or negatively
correlated after removing these three factors from the indexes. This suggests that the three
factors indeed capture the systematic component of sentiment.
We further demonstrated that, in addition to the equity premium puzzle, the Sentiment
CAPM provides an explanation for ﬁve other anomalies for the aggregate stock market: The
return predictability of the price/dividend ratio, the relation between the equity premium
and market volatility (and its dependence on sentiment), the relation between the equity
premium and market tail risk (and its dependence on sentiment), the eﬀect of sentiment
changes on the risk-neutral probability density, and the pricing kernel puzzle.
We also considered the microfoundations of the Sentiment CAPM, demonstrating that
the same set of calibrated parameter values that match both the historical equity premium
and the risk-free rate also robustly generate three of the most basic behavioral anomalies
from economics laboratory experiments. We concluded our analysis with an aggregation re-
sult which provided conditions such that a market of EU-Hurwicz agents with heterogeneous
subjective probabilities and heterogeneous ambiguity attitudes generates the same equilib-
rium prices as a market with a representative EU-Hurwicz agent. We observed that the
same conditions imply an aggregation result where a market with some EU agents and some
noise traders (modeled as Hurwicz agents) who trade on optimism or pessimism generates
the same equilibrium prices as a market with a representative EU-Hurwicz agent.
Future research is needed to investigate other implications of the Sentiment CAPM. Of
ﬁrst order importance is the study of the pricing implications of the Sentiment CAPM in
bond and option markets, as well as the implications of the Sentiment CAPM for the cross-
12Indeed, the average value of the theoretical sentiment index αt over our sample period that we estimated
in section 5 and that enables the model to match the Euler equation for the equity premium is 0.45.
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section of returns.
The Sentiment CAPM provides a simple approach to relating the asset pricing literatures
on disaster risk, ambiguity aversion, positive skewness, market sentiment, and prospect
theory. In doing so, the Sentiment CAPM provides a formal approach to incorporating
the qualitative and elusive concept of sentiment into quantitatve models of equilibrium asset
pricing. The Sentiment CAPM thereby provides a means to study the eﬀects of animal spirits
(Keynes, 1936) or irrational exuberance (Shiller, 2000) on the aggregate stock market.
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Appendix A Proofs
Corollary 7:
Proof. The risk-free rate equation (10) can be re-written as
γe−ρ−θµ+
1
2
θ2σ2 + (1− γ)
(
αte
−ρ−θµ−θξσ + (1− αt)e−ρ−θµ+θξσ
)
= 1− rf,t,
where the equality comes from the fact that 1
1+rft
= e− log(1+r
f
t ) = e−rf,t , and that ex = 1 + x,
for small x. We continue using the approximation to rewrite the left hand side of the above
γ
(
1− ρ− θµ+ 1
2
θ2σ2
)
+ (1− γ)
(
αt(1− ρ− θµ− θξσ) + (1− αt)(1− ρ− θµ+ θξσ)
)
= 1− rf,t.
Simplifying the above yields equation (10).
Corollary 9:
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Proof. Consumption equals dividends in the Lucas-tree model, and hence, the Euler equation
can be written as the following
pdt = E˜tβ
(dt+1
dt
)1−θ(
1 + pdt+1
)
.
The solution to the log-linearized version of this equation is
pˆdt = (1− θ)
∞∑
j=0
(
β∆d1−θ
)j
E˜t∆ˆdt+j+1,
given that β∆d1−θ < 1. In this environment, a rise in sentiment increases E˜t∆ˆdt+j+1, while
the physical distribution of dividend growth has not changed, that is, Et∆ˆdt+j+1 is unaﬀected.
If θ ∈ (0, 1), the rise in sentiment increases pdt. Moreover, we can write the return as
Rt+1 =
(1 + pdt+1)
pdt
dt+1
dt
.
If there is no change in the distribution of future dividend growth, the expected return
EtRt+1 drops even if the rise in sentiment is permanent. The drop in expected return is
more pronounced if the sentiment series is mean reverting, that is, if tomorrow's sentiment
is lower than today's, so that pdt+1 < pdt.
For θ > 1, the above argument shows that in response to a permanent or mean-reverting
shock to sentiment, pdt drops and the expected return rises.
Corollary 12:
Proof. It is enough to show that the eﬀect of qt on equity premium decreases with sentiment,
that is, ∂
∂αt
∂EPt
∂qt
< 0. Formally, we have
∂2EPt
∂qt∂αt
= −
(
1− γ
γ
)(
(ξ2 − ξ2)θσ + (ξ + ξ)(1− 1
2
θ2σ2)
)
.
This expression is negative since we have ξ < ξ and 1
2
θ2σ2 < 1 in all relevant calibrations.
Interestingly, this expression does not depend on the value of αt.
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Corollary 15:
Proof. First, notice that as long as the distribution of the consumption growth has a small
standard deviation, we can approximate the physical probability density of the EU-Hurwicz
agent with three points: the mean of the distribution (for the EU part), and the two extreme
points above and below the mean (for the Hurwicz part). Without loss of generality, we can
shift the three-point distribution such that the mean is on zero, and the other two points are
at −ξ and ξ (assuming symmetry for simplicity). Moreover, the probabilities of the points
{−ξ, 0, ξ} are {(1− γ)(1− α), γ, (1− γ)α}. The Skewness of this distribution is
(2α− 1)(1− γ) (γ(2γ − 1)− 8α(1− α)(1− γ)2)
((1− γ)(4α(1− α)(1− γ) + γ)) 32
.
The derivative of this expression with respect to α is
2 (γ − 8α(1− α)(1− γ))(
(γ − 1) (4α(1− α)(1− γ) + γ)5) 12 .
Thus, ∂ Skewness
∂α
> 0 if
γ >
8α(1− α)
1 + 8α(1− α) .
For the sake of numerical comparison, the right hand side is largest at α = 0.5, for which
the lower bound on γ is 2
3
. As α approaches 0 or 1, the lower bound on γ approaches
zero. More generally, for the asymmetric three point distribution {−ξ, 0, ξ} with weights
{(1 − γ)(1 − α), γ, (1 − γ)α}, the partial derivative condition ∂ Skewness
∂α
> 0 is equivalent to
having
γ >
α(1− α)(ξ + ξ)3
−(1− α)2ξ3 + (2 + α− 3α2)ξ2ξ + α(5− 3α)ξξ2 − α2ξ3
,
whose behavior is almost identical to the symmetric case for our calibration of {ξ, ξ}.
Proposition 17:
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Proof. Under the no short-sale constraint, an EU-Hurwicz agent in the economy we consider
is formally equivalent to an EU agent that puts additional probability weight on the two
extreme outcomes of the distribution that will be truncated when unbounded relative to an
EU agent with correct probability beliefs.
We can then ﬁnd the general equilibrium solution to the economy populated with a unit
measure of agents indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. The maximization problem for agent i is
max
Cit,Bit,Sit
logCit + Etβ logCit+1 + · · ·
Cit + P
b
t Bit + PtSit = Bit−1 + (Dt + Pt)Sit−1,
where Cit is the consumption and Bit, Sit are the bond and stock holdings of agent i for the
next period. The maximization yields the Euler equations
Eitβ
Cit
Cit+1
Rt+1 = 1
Eitβ
Cit
Cit+1
Rft = 1,
where Rt+1 =
Dt+1+Pt+1
Pt
, and Rft =
1
P bt
. The market clearing conditions for this Lucas tree
economy are
∫ 1
0
Citdi = Dt,
∫ 1
0
Bitdi = 0, and
∫ 1
0
Sitdi = 1. The general equilibrium of this
economy is the set of allocations {Cit, Bit, Sit} and prices {Pt, P bt } such that given the prices,
the allocations satisfy the Euler equations and the market clearing conditions.
Claim. The general equilibrium solution of the Lucas tree economy is the allocations Cit =
(1 − β)Wit, Bit = 0, Sit = βWitPt (where Wit = Bit−1 + (Dt + Pt)Sit−1 is the wealth of
agent i at time t, and Wt = Pt + Dt is the aggregate wealth) and the prices Pt =
β
1−βDt,
P bt =
(
Eitβ
Dt
Dt+1
)−1
.
Proof. It is easy to verify that given the prices, the allocations satisfy the Euler equations
and the market clearing conditions. Note that the reason that all agents agree on the bond
price is that they all have the same expected value of the inverse of the next period aggregate
dividend growth Eit
Dt
Dt+1
.
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Next, observe that replacing all the agents with the representative agent is the same
as removing i in the above equations. Similarly, the general equilibrium consumption is
Ct = (1− β)Wt, with the market clearing condition Bt = 0, St = 1, Ct = Dt, and the same
stock price. The bond price P bt =
(
Etβ
Dt
Dt+1
)−1
agrees with the previous economy if and
only if Et
Dt
Dt+1
= Eit
Dt
Dt+1
.
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Figure 6: Expected market return and its standard deviation using the GARCH(1,1) model.
Monthly data (1987m11-2018m12).
52
−
2
−
1
0
1
2
2009m7 2012m7 2015m7 2018m7
date
CCI
Fitted
(a) Consumer Confidence Index (CCI)
−
3
−
2
−
1
0
1
2
2009m7 2012m7 2015m7 2018m7
date
ICS
Fitted
(b) Consumer Sentiment Index (ICS)
−
1.
5
−
1
−
.
5
0
.
5
2009m7 2012m7 2015m7 2018m7
date
BW
Fitted
(c) Baker−Wurgler Investor Sentiment Index
−
2
−
1
0
1
2
2009m7 2012m7 2015m7 2018m7
date
Bull
Fitted
(d) AAII Bull Index
Figure 7: Sentiment indexes and their predicted values using the three-factor model.
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Table 9: Information criteria for diﬀerent GARCH speciﬁcations of the log market return.
GARCH LL df AIC BIC
(1,1) 682.06 5 -1354.12 -1334.51
(2,1) 682.54 6 -1353.08 -1329.55
(1,2) 682.56 6 -1353.11 -1329.58
(2,2) 682.57 7 -1351.15 -1323.70
Monthly data (1987m11-2018m12), N=373.
Table 10: Summary statistics of main variables (logged nominal returns).
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
∆c 0.0032 0.0033 -0.0162 0.0138 373
rf 0.0027 0.0022 -0.0001 0.0084 374
x 0.0095 0.0053 -0.0049 0.0183 373
q 0.0407 0.0131 0.024 0.0992 374
xr 0.0067 0.0055 -0.0101 0.0172 373
Monthly data (1987m11-2018m12).
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